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This paper discusses the issue of federalism and conflicts in Ethiopia by posing the 
question: to what extent does the current system of ethnic Federalism help to 
reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts? Although federalism is taken by many as a 
typical strategy for avoiding ethnic conflict and promoting democracy in multi-
ethnic societies, the Ethiopian experience largely suggest that the system is not 
reducing ethnic tensions and conflicts. Ethnicity being the major organizing 
principle of the federal system in the country, promotes conflicts stressing the 
primordial notions of ethnicity and mobilization. It has encouraged differences and 
competition over the control of power and resources at a local level. Thus, 
conflicts are increasing, becoming more decentralized and protracted. These 
suggest that in the Ethiopian context, there is a need to move away from using 
ethnicity as a sole criterion and to organize the federation using geographical and 
economic considerations. This would further help to reduce the current ethnic 
strife by encouraging civic nationality and trust among people.  
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Federalism began to be considered as a useful tool of state/ nation building after the 
end of the Second World War (Watts, 1994 and 2001) . Thus, several countries in 
Africa and Asia espoused this system after gaining independence as a means of 
catering for competing and conflicting aspirations for autonomy within their 
territories. Examples of such countries include India, Nigeria and Malaysia 
(Rothchild, 1966: 275–93).  
Federalism has long been considered as a system that offers a feasible means of 
integrating the interests of larger political entities, which are capable of promoting 
economic development and maintaining security, versus smaller political units which 
tend to be responsible to their own constituents and local interests (Watts, 1994). 
The system achieves this by establishing a government where power is shared 
between local and central units along with the lines of constitutionally established 
duties and responsibilities for each body of the government. However, the same 
system can also help to create and sustain conflicts that may threaten the existence of 
the polity. Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson in their discussion of this paradoxical 
tendency of federalism recognized that ―federalism has both secession inducing and 
secession preventing‖ characteristics (Erk and Anderson, 2009:192). 
Current debates on federalism, can be traced back to the 18
th
 century, and are 
largely shaped by two major developments that came after the end of the cold war 
and led to contrasting views on the desirability and success of federalism (Burgess, 
2006 and McGarry,  2005: 15). The first of these developments corresponds to the 
fall and dissolution of the USSR and the then European federations of Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia which largely reinforced the doubts about the stability and the 
durability of multi-ethnic federations (McGarry, 2005:15). Moreover, the 
secessionist sentiment in Canada‘s Quebec state and the Belgian linguistically-based 
federation added impetus to such skepticism. The second event has to do with the 
reconstitution of multi-ethnic nations through federalism as a political strategy 
adopted by a number of governments following the collapse of authoritarian 
regimes. An example of such developments is the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
along with other countries such as the Russian Federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
more recently Iraq (Roeder, 2009: 03–19 ).  
The purpose of this article is to critically assess the nature of federalism in 
Ethiopia particularly in terms of its implications for inter-ethnic relations in the 
country. The main question posed in this article is therefore: To what extent does the 
current system of Ethnic Federalism help to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts? 
This question is imperative given the fact that concerns for peace and stability 
override any development efforts or achievements in multi-ethnic nations like 
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Ethiopia. As observed elsewhere, achieving a certain level of development is not 
always a guarantee for not falling back into anarchy and endless conflicts (e.g. 
Somalia, Ivory Coast). Ethiopia presents an interesting case to examine how 
federalism works in multi-ethnic states. Ethiopia ranks 20
th
 out of 60 countries 
designated as failed states by the Foreign Policy magazine (See the Failed States 
Index 2011 at Foreign Policy, 2011) and in a recent Fragile States Index of 2018 
Ethiopia was ranked 15
th
 out of 178 countries (The Fund For Peace [FFP], 2018). 
What is alarming from these reports is that the country scored high on ‗factionalized 
elites‘ and ‗group grievances‘ as indicators of failing states. These same indictors 
can also hint the mounting ethnic tension in the country. Thus, examining how 
federalism as a political system, manages conflicts is crucial since ethnic diversity 
should be judiciously managed by a system of governance that ensures balanced 
political representation, respect for human rights as well as democracy that are vital 
for promoting development.  
Previous studies on Ethiopian federalism are overwhelmingly focused on 
specific case studies. Some of these studies discuss the nature of Ethiopian 
federalism in relation to ethnic identity and its problems (Asnake, 2009 & 2010). 
Other studies point out to the problem of managing territorially dispersed diversity 
in ethnically-based boundaries of regional states (Van der Beken, 2010: 1–30) and 
ethnic decentralization and inclusive governance in multi-ethnic cities such as Dire 
Dawa (Asnake, 2014: 589–605). Still other studies examine the role of the 
secessionist clause in the constitution and its implications for the stability of a 
multi-ethnic state (Habtu, 2005: 313–35). All these studies do not provide a 
holistic picture of the federal system and its effects on either reducing or 
exacerbating conflicts in Ethiopia except for some studies that, albeit descriptively, 
shed light on the relationship between ethnic federalism ethnic-based conflicts 
(Aalen, 2002;  Abbink, 2011: 596–618;  Assefa, 2012: 435–73). Thus, this paper 
aims to complement these few studies by using a combination of case studies and 
analysis of longitudinal data obtained from conflict data sets particularly the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to provide a rigorous 
and fresh evidence on the topic.   
The remainder of this article is organized into four sections. Section two 
provides an overview of federalism in Ethiopia along with its origins and its main 
features. Section three discusses the concept of ethnicity and looks into the theories 
of ethnic conflict laying the ground for the subsequent discussion. The next section 
examines the trends in ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and presents a review of the 
empirical observations on the subject. The final section provides concluding remarks 
based on the dominant themes that stand out from the discussions.  
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The Federal System in Ethiopia 
Background  
Ethiopia is a country with a long history of statehood in Africa that could be traced 
back to the ancient Aksumite kingdom that emerged as early as 400 BC. It is a nation 
that was never colonized by a foreign power and kept its independence. However, in 
its long history, Ethiopia‘s move towards a modern nation state could be associated 
with the time of Emperor Theodores II from 1885 to 1868 through his land reforms, 
organization of national army and other modernization efforts that gained 
momentum and consolidated during the reign of Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) 
and Emperor Haileselasse I (1930-1974) (Bahru, 1991 and Henze, 2000).  
In 1974, a committee of disgruntled military officers (Derg) staged a coup and 
took power by deposing the emperor. This set the stage for some sweeping changes 
as the Derg adopted socialism as its political ideology, abolished feudalism and 
nationalized land in 1975. The same year, the Tigray People‘s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) started its armed struggle and joined the Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front 
in the northern provinces of the country. In May 1991, the Derg was ousted from 
power and the TPLF led coalition of ethno-nationalist organizations under the name 
Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) controlled the central 
government (Markakis, 1974; Messay,  2011). The EPRDF was established in 1989 
by TPLF, EPDM (Ethiopian Peoples‘ Democratic Movement) later it was re-
structured to Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), OPDO (Oromo 
People‘s Democratic Organization), and SPDRF (Southern People‘s Democratic 
Revolutionary Movement).     
EPRDF‘s rise to power was followed by major changes in the country‘s 
national politics. A transitional government was established led by EPRDF and its 
affiliates that were organized on ethnic bases. These groups participated in the 
ratification of the 1991 Transitional Charter that recognized Eritrea‘s secession, gave 
self-determination rights to up to and including secession the various ethnic groups 
and endorsed multiparty democracy with political and civil liberties. The 1995 
constitution established a federation of nine states, created mainly on the basis of 
ethno-linguistic criterion along with the contentious clause on the right of secession 
(ICG, 2009 and Asnake, 2014). The constitution also established a bicameral 
parliamentary system with the House of People‘s Representatives elected directly 
every five years and the House of Federation with representatives from the countries 
different nationalities (Tesfaye, 2002). The term nations and nationalities is 
officially used by the state following Stalinist dictates on the question of 
nationalities instead of using the term ethnic groups. Such a discourse seems to 
ignore the historical intermingling and centuries-old interaction between the 
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various ethnic groups in the country that have implications for supra-ethnic 
nationality.  
 
Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Origin and Features  
Ethnic federalism was officially adopted by the government as a means of keeping 
the unity of the nation as there were secessionist movements guided by ethnically 
mobilized political organizations that intensified after the fall of the centralized 
regime (Ibid). However, the reconfiguration of the state‘s politics along ethnic 
lines seems to originate from the ideological motivation of the TPLF leaders that 
were inspired by Stalin‘s concepts of nationalities and self-determination and used 
them as tools to mobilize support for their struggle against the military regime 
(Aalen, 2002). Thus, this led to the formalization of ethnicity as a basic principle 
of state organization, and political representation.  
This resulted in a unique system of federalism in the country where each state 
that forms the federation has the right to secede from the union. This right is 
enshrined in article 39 of the 1994 constitution and has been and remains to be a 
bone of contention between the government and pan-Ethiopian opposition parties 
(Ibid). Creating a federation along ethnic lines and the prominent position of 
ethnicity in state politics has a number of implications for conflict generation and 
management. Before discussing these points; however, a theoretical overview on 
origin and the types of federalism comes in order.  
 
Federalism: A Theoretical Overview 
Federalism is essentially a system of government in which there is a share of 
power between national and regional political units (Ariyo, 2003). This sharing of 
power between the different tiers of government however is complex as it 
introduces a range of issues that has to do with diversity, unity, interdependence as 
well as cooperation and conflicts (Tamuno, 1998).  
In terms of types of federal arrangements, Ariyo notes that ‗federalism is 
about nature and form of association among interacting states‘ and suggests two 
types of federalism based on the nature of how the system develops. These are the 
dual federalism and the cooperative federalism. In the former case, there are 
independent levels of government with distinct responsibilities as stated by law. In 
the latter, there is a higher degree of partnership between the different tiers of 
government with the focus on delivering effective services through cooperation. It 
could be said that the dual form of federalism seems to take the arrangement as an 
end by itself whereas the cooperative one implies the use of federalism as a means 
to an end (Ariyo, 2003:1). Thus, the adaptability of federalism according to the 
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context and specific nature of a political society is not well visible in such a 
category.  
The aims of setting-up a federal state are crucially related to the circumstance 
of the individual countries. As such the prospect of creating a larger state and 
benefit from better access to economic and military resources is one of the 
advantages of federalism. Moreover, in a poly-ethnic state like Ethiopia, 
federalism is argued to help promote democracy as it prevents tyranny of the 
majority. It could also help to limit the power of the government by balancing it in 
the institutional division of powers of branches of government and the territorial 
division of power between the center and the states (Ephrem, 2010). 
Another useful classification of federalism that reflects the concern for 
context specific characters is the distinction made between the two main ways in 
which federal systems come into being. These, according to Keller, are the 
‗coming together‘ and ‗holding together‘ types of federalism (Keller, 2002). There 
is also a third variant that Stepan termed as ‗putting together‘ federalism which 
reflects the experience of Ethiopia (Stepan, 2001).  
 
Coming Together Federalism 
Coming-together federations emerge when two or more existing sovereign nations 
consent to establish a federal system for governmental efficiency, economic 
development, and security purposes. Such federations can advance economic 
growth by removing barriers for trade and by promoting peace. The crucial feature 
of ‗coming-together‘ federation is that the union is formed on voluntary basis 
(Keller, 2002 and Ephrem, 2010).  
 
Holding Together Federalism 
This type of federation involves a division of a polity into different sub-units with 
each having its own sovereignty with respect to some policies. It stands opposite to 
the coming together federalism in which sovereign states come together to create a 
common central government by surrendering a portion of their sovereignty. It is 
often considered as a political approach employed to save a disintegrating unitary 
state and to manage ethnic divisions (Keller, 2002).  
 
‘Putting Together’ Federalism 
This refers to a union that comes together through coercion or deceitful inclusion 
of various units by organized elite. The former USSR is a typical example of such 
nominal federation with a strong degree of centralization (Ephrem, 2010). Ethiopia 
began to experiment with holding together federalism in 1991 with the various 
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ethnic groups having the right of self-governance. However, as Keller argues the 
country changed its course to putting together type of federalism as the political 
sphere becomes ever more centralized by the TPLF-led federal government 
(Keller, 2002).   
Keller asserts that Ethiopia‘s ethnic federalism has not featured a democratic 
federalism that devolves authority and decision making to lower levels of 
government. He further argues that the system exhibits a growing tendency of 
centralization in which politics and development is controlled by the centre 
(Keller, 2002). 
Ethiopia's decision to implement federalism was negotiated between the 
regional elites. However, the relative strength of the regional elites was weaker as 
compared to the TPLF or Tigran elites that led the armed struggle against the Derg 
indicating that the whole process was flawed by power imbalance even at the 
inception (Tesfaye, 2002).  Some argue that the decision to adopt a federal 
structure was made in response to the ethnic nationalism movements that 
threatened the unity of the country (Frank, 2009). Without ruling out external 
pressure to decentralize, this internal factor seems evident in the number of ethnic-
based secessionist political organizations that participated in the conference 
summoned by TPLF/ EPRDF in July 1991 to form a Transitional Government. The 
national conference named ‗Democratic and peaceful transitional Conference‘ 
involved representatives of 31 political movements (most of them ethnic-based 
liberation fronts such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)). The conference 
barred certain political groupings that follow a different ideology than EPRDF 
such as Ethiopian people‘s Revolutionary Front (EPRP), all Ethiopian Socialist 
Movement (MESON) and the Coalition of Democratic Ethiopian Forces 
(CODEF). All these organizations have multi-ethnic political programs based on 
civic nationality or they were pan-Ethiopian movements (Tesfaye, 2002).  
The Ethiopian federal system is also described as asymmetric both in terms of 
territorial organization and balance of power. The system created asymmetries 
between states since the federation now composes populous and big states like 
Oromia with that of Harar which is a city with the ethnic composition of the 
Hararies accounting only 7% of the population (Asnake, 2009). 
Self-government, decentralization and representation in the central (federal) 
government are important elements of federalism and thus constitutionally all the 
regional states in Ethiopia have their own judiciary, legislative power and are 
represented in the federal government and conduct their affairs (Minasse, 1996). 
Thus, on paper the country is a federation, however, according to Aalen, this 
contradicts with the reality that the ruling party follows a very centralized control 
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over all affairs in the country through its affiliates in the regions. Thus, a real 
federation is a matter of controversy due to this tighter grip by the ruling political 
elites (Aalen, 2002).  
 
Ethnicity and Ethnic Cconflict 
Theory of Ethnicity 
There are two major schools of thought on ethnicity- primordialism and 
constructivism. Primordialism focuses on self-determination and takes emotional 
and primordial attachment to fixed social characteristics, such as blood ties, race, 
language, region, and custom. Such an attachment necessarily looks for political 
sovereignty as a basic means to protect and develop the valued characteristics. 
According to primordialists, the ideal means to resolve ethnic conflicts is therefore 
to allow for the right to self-determination up to secession (Cordell and Wolff, 
2010). Such assertion seems to corroborate with the use of ethnicity in political 
mobilization in the current federal system in Ethiopia.  
The constructivists take ethnicity as an adaptive and flexible phenomenon and 
assert that it is primarily an entity that people use opportunistically to promote 
their interests. They also take ethnic identities as amenable to strategic decisions 
including discarding one‘s ethnic identity when alternative affiliations promise a 
better return (Ibid). Ethnic identities are therefore seen as fluid and individuals are 
considered to be capable of manipulating their identities or of others when either 
they feel a sharp need of cultural recognition or seek to pursue some political 
agenda (Ibid). 
Ethnic conflict may be defined as a conflict between two or more ethnic 
groups over resources, identity, borders or against political oppression (Reatile, 
2004).  According to Michael an ‗ethnic community‘ is a named human population 
with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements, which 
has a link with historical territory or homeland, and a measure of solidarity 
(Michael, 1997: 210). According to Brown, there are six criteria that must be met 
for considering a group as an ethnic community. These criteria include having a 
name for one's own community, believing in a common ancestry, mutual historical 
experiences, a shared culture, territory, and collective self-awareness (Brown, 
1997). 
Generally, the term conflict refers to a situation in which two or more actors 
pursue incompatible, yet justified goals (according to their points of view). Thus, 
ethnic conflicts are one of such conflicts in which the goal of at least one actor in 
the conflict is defined in ethnic terms with the main cause of confrontation being 
ethnic distinctions and dissatisfactions (Wolff, 2006). 
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According to Rothman, ‗ethnicity has never been absent from politics, and it 
only achieved visible expressions in post-colonial Africa (Rothman, 1997: 43).‘ It 
is common for disputants to totally miss each other when they speak about their 
respective needs and aspirations. The consequences of such misunderstandings 
always show us the erosion of mutual trust and the waning of tolerance. Identity-
conflicts are often hard to identify since they usually get confused with disputes 
over tangible resources. More importantly, though theoretical distinctions between 
identity and interest conflicts may be valid, their differences are not so precise and 
clear-cut in practice. However, it is fair to say that while all identity conflicts 
contain interest conflicts; not all interest conflicts contain identity conflicts. 
Kaufman uses the security dilemma as explanatory variable in ethnic relations 
and conflict. He considers ethnic groups not as unified entities but as arenas of 
interacting elites and masses that produce the dynamics of security dilemma 
leading to conflict. He also stresses on the role of elites vis-à-vis masses in shaping 
ethnic identities by asserting that ethnicity needs to be viewed through the 
constructionist lens (Kaufman, 1996). One of the pre-conditions for ethnic conflict 
according to Kaufman, is the creation of opportunities for mobilization which can 
be manifested in the political space such as political freedom, territorial base in a 
neighbouring country as well as state failure (Kaufman, 2001 as cited in Cordell 
and Wolff, 2010).  
All these adequately reflect the history of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia and the 
use of ethnic identities in politics mainly by The Eritrean People Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the TPLF which have a long history of armed struggle in Ethiopia. 
Thus, the country‘s advent into ethnically based federalism can be taken as an 
example of the instrumental use of ethnicity for mobilizing people to gain political 
power by elites (Minasse, 1996). The system of ethnic federalism according to 
Messay seems to be a result of a deliberate policy imposed by the ruling elites to 
promote ethnicization in the country at the expense of national integration. Such 
moves contrast with how federalism is used to reduce ethnic tensions and maintain 
unity in countries such as India and Nigeria (Minasse, 1996; Messay 2009).  
 
Research Approach 
This paper followed two methodological approaches to the analysis of ethnic 
conflict and its relationship with ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. First, it used 
document review of several cases of ethnic conflicts by organizing these cases into 
similar and dominant themes. The themes provide an overview of federalism in 
Ethiopia along with its origins and its main features, and discuss the concept of 
ethnicity and looks into the theories of ethnic conflict laying the ground for further 
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discussion. In addition, the paper uses the Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Data Project (ACLED) to analyse the trend in ethnic conflict so as to provide more 
rigorous empirical evidence on the subject by implementing linear regression 
model, which is presented in Appendix A. The two approaches were used 
concurrently to strengthen the validity of the findings and conclusions. However, 
the paper does not attribute that ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia are solely due to 
ethnic-based federal arrangement. It rather discusses the trends in ethnic conflicts 
by focusing only on those that can be associated with ethnic boundary disputes 
attributable to elite mobilization and political agitation of communities.  
 
Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: Types and Trends 
The debate on the effects of the ethnic federal structure on conflict in Ethiopia has 
been normative and divergent. The supporters of the current federal system argue 
that the system has ushered the country into a new era of democracy by addressing 
the legacy of ethnic inequality. They assert that this arrangement could reduce 
conflict and tensions by promoting accommodation, self-rule, harmony and co-
existence among ethnic groups in multi-ethnic countries and help to reduce 
secessionist movements and national disintegration in countries like India and 
Switzerland (Andreas, 2004 and Kymlicka, 2006).  
Critics, however, argue that the use of ethnicity as the main organizing device 
of the federation have compartmentalized the political space by encouraging a 
primordial notion of identity which in turn promotes secessionism and puts the 
nation in a quagmire of endless conflicts. Such critics cite the cases of dissolved 
ethno-federal arrangements such as that of the USSR, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia.  
In this regard, empirical studies show that ever since the introduction of the 
ethnic-based federal structure in Ethiopia, there have been an upsurge of ethnic 
conflicts and the sharpening of boundaries among the different ethnic groups 
(Aalen, 2002) and ethnicity has become an instrument of political mobilization and 
perpetuating violence, dissension and a growing sense of separatism in Ethiopia 
(Muhabie, 2015).  
Essentially, the issue that ethnicity being given primacy over other notions of 
state organization, political representation as well as resource entitlement led to the 
constitution of institutions that legalize and drew boundaries among the different 
ethnic groups. Thus, defining the identities of many communities became a 
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 Case 1: Conflict between Oromo and Ethiopian Somali communities 
Members of the elders’ council in Ethiopia Somali regional state remembered the 
long years of inter-tribal conflict that prevailed in the region which obstructed 
development interventions. With recognition and strong support obtained from the 
regional government, the elders’ council has contributed much to the stability of 
the region. The elders’ council has resolved such conflicts and studied the nature 
of cross border and inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. During the 8th session of a 
regional level consultative conference held in May 2017 in Jigjiga city, the issue of 
inter-ethnic conflict particularly conflict between people of the Ethiopian Somali 
and Oromia regional states were one of the major discussion agenda along with 
drought. Participants informed the regional government how conflict took away 
lives of people and resulted in IDPs in the region. According to them, competition 
for land resources particularly scarce water and grazing has always been 
prominently inherent sources of disputes between the two communities. Both 
pastoralists and farmers needed more land to graze their livestock and produce 
crops. However, these conflicts now have a political motive along the border areas 
of both communities. According to key informants of this study, both communities 
until recently have been in a state of war particularly in South and North west side 
of the Ethiopian Somali regional state along the border extending from Moyale to 
Muli Woreda near Meiso. The ever increasing ethnic conflicts and tensions 
between the two groups resulted in increased population of IDPs. IOM report 
supports the elders’ narrative on growing population of IDPs. According to the 
report, Liben, Erer and Fafan zone alone hosted over 17,000 and about 13,000 
IDPs of conflict settled in Siti zone since 2014 ( IOM, 2017). Referring to the 
Ethiopian government and its humanitarian partners, IDMC also indicated around 
67,800 people to have displaced due to communal conflict associated to drought in 
Oromia and Ethiopian Somali regional State between 2015 and 2016 (IDMC, 
2016). The conflict between the two has recurred again in the border areas 
particularly around Moyale and its environs costing lives of civilians, people in 
military uniform and is still ongoing prompting the national defense force to 
intervene with the order of the ex-Prime Minister.  The conflict re-occurred with a 
political motive on the 4
th
 of August 2018 resulting in the death of people and huge 
destruction of businesses and houses in Jigjiga, Gode, Kebridahar and Degahabur 
towns. A youth group known as Heego was blamed to have coordinated the attacks 
on non-Somali ethnic groups and political figures of the then Ethiopian Somali 
People Democratic Party (now Somali People Democratic Party including the 
former president of the region, Abdi Mohammed Oumer) who are under custody of 
police.  
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Ethnic conflicts (Case 1) are further aggravated by drought related and natural 
factors shrining the negotiation space that otherwise prevailed in the past in the use 
of the commons. That is part of the reason that many scholars tend to be sceptical 
about the use of ethnicity as an organizing principle in Ethiopian federalism along 
with the right to secession provided in the constitution. For instance, Lyons argues 
that the ethnicization of politics prompts ethnic conflict and encourages political 
activism on ethnic issues and fragment national politics (Lyons, 1996). Thus, the 
system has increased localized conflicts which seem to work to the advantage of 
the ruling regime that wants to keep the centre free of strong political opposition. 
Following the coming of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to the chairpersonship of 
EPRDF, however, the nationalist and reconciliation agenda has dominated the 
political discussion as reflected in many of his speeches. This is also evident in his 
successful effort in restoring normal diplomatic relationships that put to rest the 
twenty years old no war no peace status quo between Eritrea and Ethiopia.  
 
Case 2: Conflict between Afar and Issa clan of the Somali communities  
External factors exacerbate ethnic conflicts and animosity (Soeters, 2005 and 
Suhrke et al., 1977). Similar interventions in the past are to blame for continued 
conflict between the Afar and the Issa clan of the Somali community. Such a 
conflict is further aggravated by competition for scarce resources, territorial 
expansion and cultural ethos (Getachew, 1997 and Thesiger, 1935). For most of 
the period since 1997, there was tense conflict up until 2015 when a peace deal 
was brokered by the federal government of Ethiopia that gave back the three 
Woredas (Gedamayitu, Undufo and Adayitu) to Afar regional state. Informants of 
the research disclosed that despite the political victory of re-claiming their land on 
the Afar side, absolute stability is far from being reached. Conflicts between the 
two communities seem to continue as the Issa demand for self-rule and special 
Woreda status intensifies. 
 
Ethnicity being the major organizing principle of the federal system has 
implications for increasing localized conflicts which are indicated to have become 
consistent characteristics in ethnic relations in Ethiopia. In this regard, Asnake 
outlines the following four major trends of conflict in the country (Asnake, 2009:  
99-104).  
 
Federal Restructuring and Identity Conflicts 
The central position of ethnicity in the Ethiopian federal system means that groups 
wanted to have a recognition as a ‗nation, nationality or people‘ and representation 
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in politics. This was fairly easy for the relatively larger ethnic groups. However, 
defining the ethnic identity of many minority ethnic groups has emerged as one of 
the areas of local/regional conflicts. Moreover, institutionalization of ethnicity 
based on primordial features of identity added fuel to the conflict as groups 
considered part of another ethnic group have now resorted into a struggle for 
recognition of separate ethnic identities as this could lead to representation at 
regional and federal tiers of government. An example of such identity conflict is 
the one between the Gurage and the Silte groups in the south region that eventually 
resolved through referendum.  
Thus, it could be argued that such trends of Ethnic federalism based on 
primordial thinking of identity could contribute to the undermining of communal 
bonds and increases tensions between clans of the same ethnic or linguistic groups. 
This can further erode the age-old networks and trust among people that form their 
social capital which is imperative for economic growth.  
 
Intra-federal Boundary Conflicts 
The restructuring of the state into federal system required the drawing of 
boundaries which is at least in theory congruent with ethnicity. However, this 
process was not smooth as there is no clear overlap between ethnicity and 
territories due to a great degree of mobility of ethnic groups in all directions. As a 
result, this generated a number of conflicts among ethnic groups that live in the 
same or neighbouring regions. Examples here include the conflict between the 
Gedeo and the Guji in southern Ethiopia that used to live in the former Sidamo 
province before 1992. In line with the principles of ethnic regionalization, the Guji 
who belong to the Oromo ethnic group became part of the Oromia region, while 
the Gedeo became part of the South region. In a very recent scenario in 2018 over 
800,000 people were displaced due to the conflict resulting in the largest conflict 
of IDPs in the country. 
 
Intra-regional Conflicts in Multiethnic Regions 
Ethnic based federalism created asymmetrical federal structure in which larger 
ethnic groups (such as the Oromo and Amhara) were given their own ethnic 
regions and the smaller (all groups in South, Gambella and Bengeshangul regions) 
were put together to establish multi-ethnic regions. In all these regions, interethnic 
conflicts become rampant triggered by disputes over the sharing of political power 
and resources. An example here is the ongoing conflict between the Anywak and 
the Nuer in Gambella region. 
 
 
Zerihun Berhane and Samuel Tefera  
118 
 
Case 3: Conflict between Afar and Amhara communities 
The establishment of regions along ethnic lines has, however, aggravated the 
territorial nature of the conflict resulting in the disruption of negotiated access to 
resources in each other’s jurisdiction. Recently, the seemingly sporadic non-
resource based conflict between the two ethnic groups is gradually getting tense. 
According to key informants, demographic changes particularly settlement 
expansion and the controversy over regional boundaries are the causes of such 
conflict. In May 2017, over 8 people lost their lives of which security officials are 
amongst them. Following the Ramadan holiday, the conflict broke out again 
claiming lives of others from both sides and came to a halt by the intervention of 
the federal police forces. This is an indication of how serious the conflicts have 
become. Most of the conflicts between the two ethnic groups have changed their 
discourse from being predominantly seasonal resource type into being territorial 
political disputes recently. The majority of such conflict encounters occur in the 
resource scarce and under developed border areas of the two regions further 
complicating the relative development and security gains of the areas.  
 
Conflicts between Titular and Non-titular Groups 
The lack of overlap between personal and territorial ethnicity due to the settlement 
of individuals and communities beyond their ethnic and administrative boundaries, 
has made it impossible to maintain an ethnically homogenous states. As a result, a 
significant portion of Ethiopians live out of their supposed ethnic homelands and 
this has affected the relationships between titular and non-titular communities. 
This problem has been worsened by the fundamentally primordialist notion of 
ethnicity that conquers in the political discourse of the country. Asnake stated the 
gaps federalism and territorial autonomy have while addressing multiethnic 
governance and the representation of non-titular groups in local and regional 
government with the exception of the informal arrangement in Dire Dawa city 
(Asnake, 2014). 
The federal structure changed the relationships between the titular and non-
titular groups. While the titular groups actively pursued their new autonomy to 
affirm their economic and political power, the non-titular groups felt a growing 
sense of insecurity and discrimination as they were excluded from politics and 
become minorities. Thus, many conflicts erupted in the relationships between the 
two groups in many parts of the country such as Harari.   
Thus, it seems that the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has not reduced conflict 
as its proponents argue. In fact, it has contributed to increasing tendencies of 
conflicts that are more local and ethnic in their nature. This fact is noted by the 
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International Crisis Group‘s report in 2009. ―The EPRDF‘s ethnic federalism has 
not dampened conflict, but rather increased competition among groups that vie 
over land and natural resources, as well as administrative boundaries and 
government budgets (ICG, 2009: 3).‖  
From the onset the federal system has created regional states that are not 
ethnically homogenous except for the Afar and the Somali regions; there are 
significant proportions of other ethnic groups that live in all regions as minorities. 
The system was also imposed from the top without much debate and gave more 
space for politically ambitious elites to create their own ethnic political 
organizations that instigated conflicts and dislocation for such ethnic groups 
designated as minorities live outside of their ethnic homelands. This could be 
attested by the frequency of overall conflicts disaggregated by type of actors in 
Ethiopia from 1997 to 2016 that indicates a sharp increase in major ethnic conflicts 
(See Figure 1). The figure shows an increasing trend in the frequency of major 
ethnic conflicts that occurred in Ethiopia between 1997 and 2016 (R
2
=0.30,p=0.01) 
this up-ward trend in ethnic conflicts also corroborates with previous findings from 
Abbink‘s study of ethnicity and conflict generation in the context of ‗ethno-
regional federalism‘ from 1991 to 2005 (Abbink, 2006). The first period roughly 
corresponds to the institution of federal constitution in 1994 and the second with 
climatic shocks and political instability at the centre following internal party 
conflicts and the war with Eritrea. These conditions are likely to have increased 













Figure 1: The frequency of major conflicts in Ethiopia by types of actors 1997–
2016
1
 (Source): Authors‘ computations from Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Version 5. 
                                                          
1 Notes 
The ACLED project codes reported information on the exact location, date, and other 
characteristics of politically violent events in unstable and warring states. ACLED focuses 
on tracking a range of violent and non-violent actions by political agents, including 
governments, rebels, militias, communal groups, political parties, rioters, protesters and 
civilians. Data contain specific information on the date, location, group names, interaction 
type, event type, reported fatalities and contextual notes. ACLED Version 5 data cover all 
countries on the African continent from 1997-2014. Weekly, real-time data is available for 
African states at acleddata.com; monthly data for South and South East Asian states is 
available monthly as of 2015. Earlier versions of the ACLED dataset cover political 
violence in African states in earlier years (Versions 4 through 2). In Ethiopia‘s case, rebel 
forces are mainly organized and mobilized on the basis of ethnicity. Thus, for analytical 
purpose, this paper merged the interaction code for rebel force with ethnic militia and treats 
the two as indicators of ethnic conflict.  
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According to Aalen, the South region can serve as a show case for the 
dramatic increase in a number of conflicts labelled as ethnic since it hosts 56 ethnic 
groups and several sub-ethnic and clan divisions (Aalen, 2002). Thus, with the 
introduction of ethnic federalism, the various ethnic groups started to compete for 
administrative boundaries led by entrepreneurial elites that wanted to redefine 
ethnic identities in order to gain control of political power. This phenomenon 
increased the number of conflicts in the region. The prominent ones include the 
conflicts between the Gurage and the Silte, the Sidama and Wolayeta, and the Guji 
and the Gedio. In 2018, the killings by xenophobic groups that demanded the 
ethnic Wolayeta to leave Hawassa city and the conflict between Guji and Gedio 
both in South Nations, Nationalities and People‘s Region are examples worth 
mentioning.  
Similarly, there have also been administrative units that triggered seemingly 
endless demands for political boundaries which resulted in more ethnic strife in 
most regional states like Beneshangul and Gambella (Asnake, 2009). Thus, 
previous conflicts that were along the lines of resources and livelihoods have now 
begun to be defined in terms of ethnic lines. This makes conflict mitigation 
inherently difficult as it creates the mobilization of large groups (Aalen, 2002). As 
noted by Roeder, ethno federal and autonomy arrangements are likely to ‗establish 
incentives for politicians to engage in confrontations over decisions, rights and link 
their confrontations to competing nation-state projects that can escalate to 
sovereignty claims‘ (Roeder, 2009: 211).  
There are also clear cases of intra-ethnic conflicts which would bring a revival 
of clan identities as an important way of taking up local political positions. This 
revival of clanship according to Aalen has resulted in active ethnic group markers 
such as heightened inequalities between clans; discrimination against certain 
groups and women as well as the practice of harmful traditions like abduction and 
female circumcisions (Aalen, 2002).  
There has been a revival of conflicts that are often instigated by political elites 
that use identity politics as a means to capture political positions. This in some 
cases led to the institutionalization of new language. A case in point is the conflict 
among Wolaitta, Gamo, and Dawro over ‗WoGaGoDa‘ between 1999 and 2000 as 
discussed by Abbink. Moreover, conflicts over identities and territories increased 
as ethnic groups continuously vied to gain separate administrative status in the 
form of special districts within regional states. As a result, in the two decades 
between 1997 and 2016 close to 33 major ethnic-based conflicts erupted in the 
country owing mainly to boundary disputes and demarcations fuelled by political 
elites that compete for regional autonomy and power (see ACLED Fig 1).  
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Moreover, as Roeder suggests, the existence of ethnic homelands can create 
opportunities for ‗ethnic entrepreneurs‘ to press for their claims successfully 
against a common-state government helping to protract ethnic conflicts. This has 
been clearly demonstrated by the surge in the number of ethnic conflicts in 
Ethiopia in recent years, which is likely to have an increasing trend (see Figure A 
and B Appendix B).  
 
Conclusion 
Federalism has been and is still used as a remedy for the problem of managing 
ethnically diverse countries. However, whether federalism delivers its promises of 
recognition and respect for the range of political, cultural and ethnic rights and 
therefore reduction in ethnic tensions and conflicts largely varies depending on the 
context and the political culture. Thus, it seems that factors like the nature of the 
federation, its evolvement and the role of political elites and the basic principles 
used to organize the system matters a lot.  
The available evidences seem to suggest that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is 
not helping reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts. In fact, conflict is escalating due 
to the ethnic heterogeneity of the regional states and the resource plus boundary 
sharing between different groups. Conflicts are increasing and becoming 
decentralized which seems to defy the argument that ethnic federalism can be a 
typical strategy for avoiding conflict in multi-ethnic societies. In fact, the 
Ethiopian case seems to highlight the roles of political elites and their capacity to 
manipulate ethnic identities at the expense of societal stability. Thus, there is a 
need to promote ties between the various ethnic groups based on civic notions of 
nationality and using commonly shared values in view of the past achievements 
and future economic development. In this regard, the sole criterion of using 
ethnicity to organize the federation should be overhauled to accommodate for 
geographical and economic considerations as well as creating unity in diversity, 
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Appendix A: Linear Regression Model  
Trend refers to the rate at which a certain event such as conflict changes over a 
time period and it is often determined by the relationship between this variable and 
time (Zerihun and Prowse, 2013). The magnitude of trend in a time series can be 
determined by parametric tests (using regression analysis) or non-parametric tests 
(e.g. Mann-Kendall trend test). In this study we first implemented linear regression 
model to test the existence of trend on conflict data.  
The linear regression analysis is used with time as the independent variable 
and the number or frequency of ethnic-based conflicts as the dependent variable. 
This method is extensively used in other fields of investigation such as climate 
change studies (See Cheung, Senay and Singh, 2008; Karmeshu, 2012 ; Jain and 
Kumar, 2012). The linear regression model is given by: 
                             
ε βXy
                                  (1) 
where, y is number of ethnic-based conflicts (the dependent variable);        
α  is the intercept;  
β is the coefficient of the explanatory variable (the slope)  
X is the independent variable (time) and;  
ɛ is the stochastic term (the residual) 
The linear trend value is represented by the slope of the simple least-square 
regression line. The linear regression model makes strong assumptions about the 
distribution of the dependent variable (y) over time. These assumptions mainly 
apply to the residuals being normally distributed, independent (with no serial 
correlation), and identically distributed (with constant variance) (Frei, 2014).  
In most cases, time-series data are assumed to consist of a long-term trend 
component and a white noise residual component (i.e. with no serial correlation) 
(Madsen et al., 2014; Frei, 2014). In practice, due to the multi-year existence of 
natural climate variability (Zhang et al., 2000), errors from adjacent time periods 
may be correlated across time. In this context, assuming white noise residuals may 
result in overestimating the significance of the trend (Wooldridge, 2008). 
Therefore, after checking the model for the critical assumptions, the t-test 
(parametric test) is used to assess whether the slope‘s coefficient of the fitted linear 
regression is significantly different from zero, indicating the presence of a linear 
 
EJOSSAH Vol. XIV, No.1                                                             June 2018 
129 
 
trend. The null hypothesis for the test is that β = 0 (data not linearly dependent on 
time) and the alternative hypothesis is β ≠ 0.  
The test statistic (linear regression T-Test) is given by: 
                                                    
 













                                                
(2) 
where,  
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Appendix B: Trend Analysis of Conflict Data 
 
Figure A: The frequency of major conflicts in Ethiopia by types of actors 1991–
2016 
Source: Authors‘ computations from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
















Figure B: The Moving Average Trend in frequency of Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia 
1991–2016 
Source: Authors‘ computations from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project (ACLED) Version 5 and Abbink (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
